The Family Court properly dismissed the petition for lack of standing. A nonparent may have standing to seek to displace a parent's right to custody and control of his or her child, but only upon a showing that “the parent has relinquished that right due to surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness, or other extraordinary circumstances” (
Matter of Bailey v. Carr, 125 AD3d 853;
see Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 548;
Matter of Diana B. v. Lorry B., 111 AD3d 927). Here, the petitioner, who is neither an adoptive parent nor a biological parent of the subject child, failed to allege the existence of extraordinary circumstances that would establish her standing to seek custody (
see Matter of A.F. v. K.H., 121 AD3d 683, 684;
Matter of Behrens v. Rimland, 32 AD3d 929, 931;
Matter of Marquis B. v. Alexis H., 110 AD3d 790, 790–791). Contrary to the petitioner's contention,
Family Court Act § 417 and
Domestic Relations Law § 24 do not provide her with standing as a parent, since the presumption of legitimacy they create is one of a biological relationship, not of legal status (
see Family Ct Act § 418[a];
Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 NY3d 576, 593;
Matter of Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 7;
Matter of Marilene S. v. David H., 63 AD3d 949, 950), and, as the nongestational spouse in a same-sex marriage, there is no possibility that she is the child's biological parent (
see Matter of Q.M. v. B.C., 46 Misc.3d 594, 599;
Wendy G–M. v. Erin G–M., 45 Misc.3d 574, 578).